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ABSTRACT
Browsing privacy solutions face an uphill bale to deployment.
Many operate counter to the economic objectives of popular on-
line services (e.g., by completely blocking ads) and do not provide
enough incentive for users who may be subject to performance
degradation for deploying them. In this study, we take a step to-
wards realizing a system for online privacy that is mutually bene-
cial to users and online advertisers: an information market. is
system not only maintains economic viability for online services,
but also provides users with nancial compensation to encourage
them to participate. We prototype and evaluate an information
market that provides privacy and revenue to users while preserving
and sometimes improving their Web performance. We evaluate fea-
sibility of the market via a one month eld study with 63 users and
nd that users are indeed willing to sell their browsing information.
We also use Web traces of millions of users to drive a simulation
study to evaluate the system at scale. We nd that the system can
indeed be protable to both users and online advertisers.
KEYWORDS
Browsing privacy, Information market
1 INTRODUCTION
Most online services currently provide users with the same stan-
dard terms of usage: users may use them free of charge but those
uses are monetized through data collection used for online advertis-
ing. is economic model was long criticized by privacy advocates,
due to the growing amount of information collected about each
user [29, 34], and the lack of eective control it provides her over
how it is used. Indeed, this model recently came under a new
stress: Sowares that block ads and/or limit some third party track-
ing [8, 15, 42] are no more conned to a minority of savvy users:
Adoption by Internet users is already reported up to 35% in two
European countries in 2015, and more importantly, quickly growing
everywhere, including the largest advertising markewith the same
standard terms of usage: ts [11]. Some ad-blocking even comes
shipped for the default browser on mobile platforms such as Apple
iOS 9 [1]. ose users who in eect opt-out of tracking or advertis-
ing (at least partially) are estimated to negatively aect ad revenues
in the tens of billions [11]. ose revenue losses motivated multi-
ple research prototypes and development for alternative ways to
collect, manage and exploit personal data: personal data store, lock-
ers, intent-casting and privacy preserving ad personalization, see
[9, 21, 41] and more than 50 related development eorts mentioned
at cyber.law.harvard.edu/projectvrm/.
Online privacy solutions such as those mentioned above typi-
cally struggle with restricted deployment due to the incentives (or
lack thereof) that they produce. On the one hand a unilateral opt-
out solution - deployed by a user herself, such as blocking [15, 42] -
may be dicult to congure as it oen impacts service quality [25].
e incentive actually exists for ad-networks, aggregators, and
publishers to cause disruption in service for such opt-out users, as
its adoption by a user signicantly reduces the value she gener-
ates [17, 28]. In contrast, a cooperative solution - deployed jointly
by multiple parties (e.g., aggregators, publishers, users) [30, 49] -
may in principle oer incentives to all. However, most of these
systems oer users enhanced privacy but no more, and lile is
formally known about the incentives oered to other parties. Much
evidence suggests that enhanced privacy alone can be dicult for
users to perceive and treat as a rational choice, even among users
self-reporting a concern for tracking [14] (a trend we conrm in
our experiment).
Here we evaluate through experiments and data-driven analysis
the promise of a dierent online privacy solution: an information
market. In contrast to all the above systems, an information market
implements an incentive for all parties to participate. Users, for
instance, can enjoy enhanced privacy by selecting which of their
data can be used and be compensated for those. Depending on
how the information market is designed, other parties may nd it
protable to use for their interaction with online users. e idea of
information markets is not new [20, 27, 36, 45], and is even oered
by some products today [2–4]1 but very lile is known of their
economic viability. Even less is known about how they should
be designed to engage users, let alone how they could gradually
encourage an incremental adoption. is paper provides a much
needed evaluation of each of those aspects, concluding that infor-
mation markets show some promise. While information markets
could be applied to multiple forms of personal data, in this work
we focus on their application to third party tracking during web
browsing, for two reasons: First, third party tracking is a critical
component of today’s online advertising; second, the sharing of
1For simplicity we focus on nancial incentives here, but compensation can be in the
forms of upgrade or discounts.
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browsing data with third parties is oen cited rst among causes
of concern by online users [12].
is paper presents the following contributions
• We design and build a simplied information market for
third party web tracking. rough a simple architecture,
this system enables selective privacy protection and eco-
nomic transactions over data. Our design seamlessly inte-
grates with today’s web tracking and ad-network functions
to be backward compatible. In fact, it even allows users to
benet from a performance boost as we show it can easily
be combined with web acceleration features. (§3)
• We conduct a 30-day experiment with 63 participants in
two metropolitan areas to observe the eect of economic
incentive on online users’ behaviors. We conrm that self-
reported privacy aitudes may not always alignwith actual
data disclosures by users. More importantly, we validate
that the two features of an information market, i.e., privacy
when you want it, compensation when you do not, are
eectively used and managed by users. Every user has
some data they choose to protect, although disclosing it
would increase their earning up to 52%. As their browsing
expands and new data gets created, users also oen choose
economic returns over data protection. In fact, we observe
a growing engagement during our user study, and an over-
whelming majority claims to be likely to use such a system
if it was deployed. (§4)
• We study the potential for an incremental deployment of
an information market at a large scale. To do so, we extend
a model predicting today’s online advertising revenue per
user. rough cooperative game theory we analyze how
market forces may aect revenue redistribution to dierent
parties should information market be oered as an option.
We then assume that a party adopts an information mar-
ket only when positive benets are gained, which may in
turn aect others’ decision to adopt. We use this model
to analyze spread of adoption in several HTTP traces con-
taining up to 3 million users, along with the publishers
and third parties they interact with. is model predicts
signicant revenue growth (up to 9-12%) as information
market expands the availability of high quality data about
users. A signicant fraction of the users (from 35% to 92%
depending on the traces) adopt information market and
receive monetary gain. (§5)
To our knowledge these results present the rst data driven
evaluation of information markets and their potential to scale to
the web. We recognize that deployment of an information mar-
ket remains a hard problem: Online user privacy is increasingly
more complicated, as new forms of tracking or re-identication [13]
come into play. e complexity of the online advertising ecosystem
creates multiple frictions to deployment[50]. Moreover, there is
economic incentives for users to game the system (we monitored
our user study closely and conrmwe did not observe any instances
of gaming to pollute our data and ndings, and discuss in §4.3 how
gaming can be detected). Given those limitations, it is important to
interpret our results in their context: First, they assume that the in-
formation market operates in a way that allows users to technically
opt-out. Also our architecture allows the privacy preserving mod-
ule to evolve to handle new forms of tracking and re-identication.
Second, our analysis of online revenue and its redistribution neces-
sarily makes some assumptions (following bargaining resolution
as classically drawn by Nash and later Shapley). Our results prove
at least that a few conventional wisdoms about online privacy may
not always hold. Solutions oering privacy choices and compensat-
ing users for data may not necessarily reduce overall advertising
revenue; they may even benet publishers. is contributes to the
ongoing debate over who benets from targeted advertising [39].
Finally, in terms of design, our results help in proving the promise
of enabling selective privacy: our experiments show that users are
able to determine the data they want to protect, and those they are
eager to sell. For the laer, our trace analysis revealed for the rst
time that opportunities abound for an information market to make
data more widely available, fueling more revenue. ese trends may
be reproduced under dierent conditions and assumptions than
ours. Our ndings contribute to argue that the arms race we ex-
perience between blocking and more invasive tracking techniques
may not necessarily in the long term serve the interests of online
publishers and the advertising industry overall.
2 BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS
Targeted advertising has increased in usage over the last few years
and generally comes in multiple varieties: contextual, retargeting
and behavioral [38]. e last one has been oered by Google since
2009 [5]. While contextual advertising serve ads based on the con-
tent of the page embedding the ads, both retargeting and behavioral
utilize the browsing history of a user to place relevant ads.
Past browsing behavior is obtained by aggregators via embed-
ding themselves in Web pages as 3rd-parties in combination with
seing cookies in the browser (NB: Other techniques such as nger-
printing exist; we discuss them in Sec. 3.1). Consider the following
example: (i) user Alice visits publisher pubA.com which contains
references to a 3rd-party aggregator: agg.com. (ii) If Alice is visit-
ing pubA.com for the rst time, the HTTP response is the content of
the page being requested along with a Set-Cookie HTTP header,
with cookies pertaining to pubA.com. Likewise, if Alice has never
visited agg.com (or any page with them as a 3rd-party), the re-
sponses from this domain will also include Set-Cookie header. (iii)
Alice next visits publisher pubB.com that also contains references
to aggregator agg.com. As a cookie for agg.com was set when she
visited pubA.com, Alice’s browser sends this cookie to agg.com
along with its request. us, agg.com now knows that Alice visited
both pubA.com, and pubB.com and can use this to customize which
ads to show.
is type of 3rd-party tracking is considered objectionable by
many, because it results in Alice’s browsing history being revealed
to 3rd-parties that she is unaware of. While publishers themselves
may also track Alice over time – 1st-party tracking – Alice is gen-
erally aware of 1st-parties that she is dealing with. In contrast, a
publisher may embed any number of 3rd-parties without notifying
the user. e rst goal of our system is to give transparency and
control to Alice in the context of 3rd-party tracking. A key dier-
ence with previous solutions to that problem is that Alice - aware
that part of her browsing history may boost the revenue of the
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ads shown on the websites she visits - may sometimes be eager
to disclose some of that information selectively for an appropriate
reward. Permiing such a data transaction is the second goal of our
system.
Overall, we hope to design an information system that can be
built and used experimentally. It should hence satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) Selective Privacy protection. e system should protect
users’ browsing history from being revealed to 3rd-party
aggregators. Note that this protection is critical even for
the data the user intends to sell. Without privacy protection
there is no incentive for aggregators to enter the market
as they can obtain users’ data via conventional means. e
system should generally enable users to disclose only a
ne-grained subset of their browsing.
(2) Backwards and incentive compatibility. First, thismeans
that the system should work with today’s tracking and
online advertising systems, with minimal modications
required for the delivery of ads. is helps in reducing
friction in adoption for data aggregators and ad-networks.
Second, it should encourage adoption by providing dier-
ent parties with the right economic incentives. Note that
this last requirement is more complex as decisions of sev-
eral parties together interact to change revenue. is is
why we will carefully study how dierent designs aect
online revenue sharing.
(3) Access to data. Unlike existing proposals [19, 30, 49] an
information market should not require aggregators to com-
municate targeting algorithms–which may be considered
trade secrets–to the system. Instead, aggregators should
be able to purchase raw data about users’ browsing habits
(i.e., when and what sites the user has visited).
(4) Avoid having users price data. Since aggregators have
knowledge of the relative value of user data (e.g., somebody
who visits Rolex.com may have higher value) they are in
the best position to determine prices in the market. Further,
having users assign value to their own data [18] or calculate
the loss of utility with their information release [26] is non-
trivial. We design an information market where the price
is set by the demand for data from aggregators; we believe
they are in a beer position to price the data appropriately.
3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Our market solution, designed for the aforementioned require-
ments, is deployed in the network by a trusted third party e.g., a
government body or an ISP, as illustrated in Fig. 1. First, we im-
plement a privacy preservation module to keep user’s browsing
history private from 3rd-party aggregators. Users who opt-in to
the market have all their Web requests routed through our system,
which provides privacy protection by blocking known forms of
Web tracking (Sec. 3.1). Note that we do not block ads (or any
other requests) and allow them to be shown to the user. e system
only prevents leakage of personally identiable information (PII)
to advertisers.
Each user then creates a whitelist, which is a list of Web sites, if
any, they are willing to be tracked on by 3rd-party aggregators in
Figure 1: Overview of our system. Alice opts in and creates
a whitelist, comprising of sites she’s willing to disclose her
visit to. Alice’s Web requests are routed through our system.
See Sections 3.1-3.3 for detailed descriptions for each mod-
ule shown.
Figure 2: Sample of whitelists along with visit frequencies
shown to aggregators to valuate users and bid on them. Note
that aggregators will not know who users 1 and 2 are until
they bid on them and win the auction on these users. ey
are then granted access to these users and can track them on
their whitelisted sites.
return for monetary compensation. Users’ whitelists along with
their frequency of visits to those sites are then anonymized and pre-
sented to participating aggregators. Fig. 2 shows a sample of what
aggregators see. Aggregators can then valuate each anonymized
user based on their whiteliste and frequency of visits to these sites,
and bid on them if interested (Apx. B). e system then runs an
auction (Sec. 3.3) for each user to determine the winning aggrega-
tors, if any, and the winning bid. Each winning aggregator then
pays that user the winning amount and in return gets access to the
user for the duration of the next auction period. We dene access
as the ability to track the user across their whitelisted sites and use
this information as input to any proprietary targeting algorithms
to serve targeted ads to the user on those sites.. Note that adding
a Web site to the whitelist by itself does not allow aggregators to
track the user on that site. Aggregators still have to bid, win, and
compensate the user before they can track them.
Next, we discuss each module in more detail.
(1) Privacy preserving module: handles all web requests of all
users and provides privacy.
(2) Web accelerationmodule: compensates for any performance
loss due to the added privacy protection.
(3) Economic module handles auctions and economic transac-
tions between the users and aggregators.
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fooA.com
ALICE
fooA.com
BROWSER
host: fooA.com, cookie: xfooA.com
host: B.com, cookie: xB.com
host: C.com, cookie: xC.com
WHITELIST
fooA.com, ...
BUYERS
B.com, ...
C.com
B.com
set,cookie: yC.com
PROXY
host: fooA.com, cookie: xfooA.com
host: B.com, cookie: xB.com
host: C.com
paid by
B.com
+
3rd-party didn't pay:
drop cookie and set,cookie
3rd-party paid: go through
1st-party: go through
Figure 3: Alice visits a whitelisted site fooA.com with two trackers B.com and C.com. Since B.com has paid to access Alice, it
receives cookies. C.com’s cookies are dropped in both directions. Note B.com’s cookies would be dropped if fooA.com is not
whitelisted.
3.1 Privacy preserving module
e privacy preserving module handles all HTTP requests and
responses for users with the objective to provide privacy protection
against 3rd-party tracking,without blocking any requests, including
advertisements. Below we discuss dierent tracking methods and
how the privacy preserving module deals with each of them:
Cookies: HTTP cookies are the most prevalent method for online
tracking. Using cookies, a tracker can assign a unique identier to
each user, which is consistent across dierent websites, and gives
them the power to track users browsing behavior. Today’s browsers
ship with options to block 3rd-party cookies. However, blocking
3rd-party cookies will not necessarily prevent 3rd-party tracking
since most browsers only block Set-Cookie in HTTP responses,
meaning if a 3rd-party already has its respective cookies set, e.g., via
popups as a 1st-party, then these previously set cookies will indeed
be sent out by the browser to the 3rd-party tracker, defeating the
purpose [46]. To prevent unwanted 3rd-party tracking via cookies,
we rst classify each HTTP request as either 1st-party-request or
3rd-party-request. A HTTP request is a 1st-party-request if the
Host and Referer headers belong to the same root domain, and
a 3rd-party-request otherwise 2. Next, if a request is marked as a
3rd-party-request, we will only let its cookies go through along
with the request if both of the following conditions are satised:
(a) the user making this request has whitelisted the root do-
main of the Referer,i.e., the top domain the user is visiting
in their browser,
(b) the root domain of the Host, i.e., the 3rd-party destination
of the request, has paid to access this user (Sec. 3.3).
Cookies are stripped o from the 3rd-party-request and its re-
sponse otherwise (Fig. 3). Set-Cookie per-se does not leak any PII,
but it is dropped to preserve user’s cookie jar consistency. Note
that since we only strip information o of requests and don’t block
them, ads would still be rendered properly in the browser.
Referers: Referer headers may contain unnecessary PII [35], and
we treat them the sameway as cookies, i.e., drop if 3rd-party-request
and one or both of the conditions mentioned above are not satised.
2With some exception cases, such as CDNs, which are treated as 1st-party. Our
technique also wrongly classies the following as a 1st party request: when a
publisher.com uses CNAME to set the DNS to point part of their trac, such as
metrics.publisher.com to a 3rd party.
Web bugs: 1x1 pixel bugs on a page are invisible to the user and
serve no content. eir sole purpose is user tracking. e prior
steps render these useless.
Etag and If-None-Match: ese optional headers are generally
used for web cache validation but can also be used for tracking [35].
When a web server is responding to a request, it can send an
Etag header that is an identier for the version of the resource
being requested. When the user makes the request to the same
resource in the future, she can send a conditional request using
the If-None-Match header. Instead of a resource identier, Etag
can contain a unique user identier for all new users, i.e., users
with no If-None-Match header in their request. When the same
user returns to the web server, they identify themselves by sending
the unique identier as If-None-Match header, hence enabling
tracking. We drop Etag and If-None-Match headers3.
Flash cookies and LocalStorage: Flash cookies and LocalStorage
can be used to respawn deleted cookies [16]. However the way we
deal with 3rd-party cookies, renders respawning useless.
JavaScript: JS can be used instead of Set-Cookie header. We
already deal with this in the same way we deal with cookies. JS
can be used by 3rd-parties to collect information about users, using
techniques such as ngerprinting [10]. Such code can be nger-
printed and blocked. is may be included in future versions of the
system, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2 Web acceleration module
To mitigate overhead of the privacy protection, we include a Web
acceleration module. To boost performance we use standard accel-
eration methods such as performing on-the-y prefetching of static
objects (images, JS, css), prioritizing trac, image compression, and
maintaining persistent TCP connections with both the user and the
origin server and using the same connection for multiple requests.
Benchmarks: In order to test our web acceleration and privacy
preserving modules for performance and functionality, we wrote a
script using PhantomJS [6] and ySlow [7] to load each Alexa top
100 sites once via our system and once directly. We repeat this
test 10 times and look at the average dierence in load time and
number of objects as a measure of functionality4. Fig. 4 shows
3e web acceleration module (Sec 3.2) mitigates any possible bandwidth overhead to
the web server.
4e expectation is that privacy protection mechanisms do not block any legitimate
content that can lead to lower quality of experience for the end-users.
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Figure 4: Performance and functionality of web accelera-
tion and privacy preservation module. Positive percentages
mean we are doing better.
that roughly 80% of sites load faster with our accelerator. With
regards to the number of objects, while most sites have the exact
same number, some have fewer or more objects when loaded via our
system. is is an expected result since most pages are dynamic and
the content does not necessarily remain the same over the course
of the experiment. We manually inspected pages with dierent
numbers of objects to conrm that the dierence is mostly due to
content change.
3.3 Economic module
At the beginning of each auction period, the economic module does
the following:
(1) Presents aggregators with anonymized whitelists and fre-
quency of visits.
(2) Collects aggregators bids on users. Aggregators bid inde-
pendent from each other.
(3) Runs an auction per user and determines the winning value
and winning aggregators (if any) for each of the users. Note
that a user’s browsing behavior can be sold to multiple
aggregators.
(4) Handles transactions between users and aggregators and
makes sure every aggregator pays all the users they won
access to. It then noties the privacy preserving module
to grant appropriate access for the duration of the next
auction period.
We let aggregators compute the value of access to a user for
the following reasons. First, aggregators have experience deriving
value from PII. Second, they are able to assess revenues on a short-
term basis through the sale of goods or ad-space, compared to
the long-term risk a user must calculate in dealing with privacy.
Finally, aggregators deal with many customers, and can take more
risk in over- or underestimating the value of access, as opposed
to users who are more risk-averse. However, there can be strong
incentives for aggregators to lie about their valuation by under-
bidding, which results in lowering the user’s revenue. To prevent
such behavior, the auction should have a truth telling mechanism
where aggregators gain no additional benet by under-bidding.
For this purpose, we rely on an auction mechanism called the
exponential mechanism [40] that has truth telling properties, and
has been shown to be close to optimal in terms of revenue for the
seller (user in our case)5. Apx. A explains the auction mechanism
in detail.
5We choose this laer objective, while noting that other objective functions (e.g., max-
imizing revenue for all players in the value chain) can be chosen.
4 USER STUDY
We implemented our system and performed a eld study to under-
stand user engagement, usability, and how users perceive economic
rewards for their data.
4.1 Implementation
e privacy preserving and web acceleration modules are managed
by a proxy, hosted on Amazon EC2, that handles all requests and
treats 3rd-party-requests according to the mechanisms described
in 3.1. For each user, the proxy maintains a whitelist, as well as a
buyers list that includes aggregators who have paid to access that
user.
We developed a browser extension to serve as an interface for
users to interact with the market. Figure 5 shows a screenshot of
the extension. It places a color-coded icon in the address bar; green
for whitelisted sites, red otherwise. Users can click to add/remove
sites to/from the whitelist, or check their current whitelist, buyers
list, and past earning.
Figure 5: Screenshot of our browser extension. User is visit-
ing google.com which is not in their whitelist.
4.2 Experimental setting
User study description A total of 63 participants located in New
York City and Boston used our system for 30 days. Our population
overrepresents male (75%), and young (85% under 25) users, and
has wide variations in income (median around $35k), technical
prociency and Internet use.
Every user was initially assigned a default whitelist containing
108 websites chosen from Alexa top 125 sites excluding social net-
work and adult sites. Users could modify their whitelist at any
time. Auctions, using the mechanism shown in Sec. 3.3, were con-
ducted every three days, resulting in 10 data points per user. At
each auction, the goods for sale are the ability to track users for the
upcoming period. Each winning aggregator pays the winning bid
value to the user and gains access to her browsing activity on her
whitelisted sites only during the subsequent auction period to deliver
targeted ads. As an example, aggregator agg.com wins access to
user u with whitelistWLu . is implies that, until the next auction,
the privacy preserving module will NOT modify 3rd-party-requests
to agg.com caused by u while visiting sites inWLu .
We did not have access to real aggregators for our study, hence
we emulated 128 aggregators, including big players such as Dou-
bleClick and Facebook. e challenge when emulating aggregators
5
estion Answers
5 4 3 2 1
Pre
1-Are you concerned about protection of your private data online?* 21% 19% 47% 11% 2%
2-Do you read the privacy policies of the websites you visit?* 0% 3% 27% 37% 33%
3-Do you use private browsing/Incognito mode while browsing?* 0% 14% 36% 40% 10%
4-Do you let mobile applications access your location on smartphone?* 5% 25% 36% 27% 7%
5-Do you maintain several passwords for multiple websites?* 13% 41% 38% 8% 0%
6-Do you think ads you see online are becoming more relevant to you?* 14% 27% 35% 21% 3%
7-How much are you willing pay for privacy protection?** 2% 3% 14% 49% 32%
8-How much do you value today’s free online services?** 16% 14% 29% 35% 6%
Post
1-How comfortable were you to receive micro-payments?* 39% 34% 17% 8% 2%
2-How satised are you with the amount you got for you information?* 17% 50% 18% 13% 2%
3-How satised are you with the performance of the system?* 20% 45% 27% 5% 3%
4-Did system give you better transparency on which data about you is used?*** 57% 32% 7% 3% 1%
5-Are you likely to use such a system if it was oered large scale?* 56% 20% 15% 7% 2%
6-Was the system fair in recognizing the value of your information?*** 38% 42% 12% 8% 0%
7-Did such a system increase your concern about your personal data?* 13% 20% 27% 23% 17%
9-Did system increase awareness on how online services monetize your data?* 28% 38% 17% 12% 5%
10-Are you likely to pay for privacy now that study has ended?** 0% 0% 28% 33% 39%
11-Did using this system make you more likely to choose a paid service that
comes with privacy guarantee over a free service?*
3% 7% 12% 35% 43%
12-How likely are you to pay for the online services that you use for free today
aer this study?*
3% 7% 15% 35% 40%
Table 1: estions asked in our pre and post study questionnaires. Users answer on a 5-point Likert Scale: *(5: A lot, 1: Not at
all), **(5: ¿$50, 4: $20-$50, 3: $5-$20, 2: $0-$5, 1: $0), ***(5: completely agree, 1: completely disagree)
is computing their valuation for users’ data. For this we use a sim-
ple model based on keywords and their estimated cost-per-click
commonly made available by ad-networks (details in Apx. B). Note
that, based on the emulated valuation of their data and the auction’s
results, users were paid using real money.
Each user was also asked to answer a questionnaire before and af-
ter the study, e pre-study questionnaire included demographical
questions as well as self reported assessment of the user’s view on
online privacy. e post-study questionnaire contained questions
about the user’s experience with the system, and assessed if using
our system changed her view on online privacy. Table 1 shows the
questions and answers we received.
4.3 Users and information markets
We made the following observations during the user study:
i) Users actively engagewith the systemand edit theirwhitelists.
We rst studied users’ engagement with the tool and how they re-
acted to dierent facets of the system. We logged the number of
HTTP requests coming from each user, which we refer to as activity.
e average activity stays in the [10k,14k] range per user during all
10 auction periods, which indicates users were using the system on
a regular basis. Users actively added/removed sites to/from their
whitelists, showing their engagement with the system, and we ob-
served a sustained growth of the whitelists used, with an average
user adding overall 50 new sites (a net 45% increase from default
whitelist) during the experiment.
As the post-study responses suggest Table 1, the majority of
users were happy with the system’s performance, receiving micro-
payments, and the amount they were making for the data they
released.
ii) Users’ disclosure does not match up with their stated pri-
vacy attitudes. We looked into users’ behavior with regards to
Bucket earning size of WL* #WL visits WL/ALL
(USD) activity
HD 2.76 230.6 151.6 0.71
MD 2.12 128 128.1 0.52
LD 1.55 115.1 67.4 0.48
Table 2: averages of earning per auction, size of whitelist,
number of whitelisted visits during auction period, and the
fraction of activity which is whitelisted for dierent buck-
ets. *WL = Whitelist
data disclosure and how it correlates with their self-reported privacy
concerns . We took the sum of the 5-point Likert Scale answers that
users gave to privacy related questions in the pre-study survey.
is gives a privacy score for each user, ranging from 8 to 20, where
higher scores indicates higher privacy concerns. Surprisingly, we
found no sign of negative correlation between users’ privacy score
and size of their whitelist; the associated correlation coecient is
low: −0.1. is, along with previous results [14], suggests that users
stated privacy concerns are at odds with their behavior. One possi-
ble explanation for this is that users are swayed by the economic
returns.
iii) Users trade o their revenues to preserve privacy of their
browsing behavior. To understand earning potentials of dierent
users, we sort users based on their whitelists’ size and split them
into three equal size buckets: high, moderate, and low volume
disclosers (resp. HD, MD and LD). Table 2 shows earning, whitelist
size, number of whitelisted visits, and fraction of whitelisted activity
for each buckets, averaged across users and auction periods. HD
users earn 31%/79% more than MD/LD users. A primary factor is
that they have larger whitelists (80%/100% more than MD/LD) that
results in 71% of their activities coming from whitelisted sites, in
contrast with 52%/48% for MD/HD users. If users were to disclose
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everything, i.e., add all the sites they browse to their whitelist, HD,
MD, and LD users could potentially increase their earnings by 29%,
48%, and 52% respectively. In other words, while users’ behavior
may not exactly follow their initial self-reported concerns, they
are willing to trade o their revenues to preserve privacy of their
browsing behavior.
iv) Users pay attention to their earning and have incentive
to game the system. As there are economic incentives in play,
it is only natural to expect gaming by users – users may decide to
expand their whitelists and browse more in order to increase their
economic returns. A key challenge is to dierentiate between users
who are abusing the system and those who are genuinely releasing
more data, by choosing to be less private and/or are more active
than average users.
To study this aspect, we sorted users based on their total earning
in auctions 1 to 5, and divided them into three groups: top-earners (8
users), low-earners (8 users), and avg-earners (rest). On average top-
earners made 6X more money than low-earners and we observed,
as expected, top-earners have indeed bigger whitelists (36% bigger
than low-earners on average) and browsemore (4.5Xmore than low-
earners on average). To evaluate whether users would adjust their
behavior and “game” the system to increase their earnings, for the
rest of the auctions, i.e., auctions 6 -10, we gave top-earners a third
of their earning and low-earners 3 times their earning. While this
change did not have any signicant eect on low-earners’ behavior
– pointing to normal behavior – we did make a few interesting
observations about top-earners: 1) we received an email from one
of the top earners complaining that the earning suddenly dropped
even though their browsing habits had not changed 2) two top
earners completely abandoned the system aer the 7th auction, 3)
three top-earners roughly doubled their whitelist trying to raise
their earning back to previous range, 4) one top earner doubled
his/her browsing activity. is suggests users pay aention to
their earning, especially once it is signicant, and that there is room
for gaming the system. Our experiment did not prevent gaming,
it is however feasible in the future to include anomaly detection
methods to detect abnormal activities.
v) Informationmarket impacts privacy attitudes. Most users
agree aer the experiment that the system gives them beer trans-
parency (96%), increases their awareness of data monetization (83%),
and they claim to be likely to use it if it is deployed (91%); see Table 1.
e experiment did not noticeably increase their privacy concerns,
nor did it aect substantially the price they would pay for privacy.
In other words, while users may still not pay for privacy, informa-
tion markets did help them form a more consistent opinion about
their online privacy and value of their data.
5 INCENTIVES FOR ADOPTION
An information market aects the revenue produced by advertise-
ment overall and also how it is shared. We capture this eect rst
in a model focusing on the transaction associated with a single user.
We then describe data used to feed this model for millions of users,
and a simple adoption dynamics based on immediate nancial in-
centive. Puing those together, we can then study the spread of
adoption and the eect of information market at web scale.
5.1 Incentive for a single user
Our model leverages recent modeling of online advertising [29]
to understand how advertising revenue changes with availability
of information. Understanding how revenue is to be distributed
among all parties is more dicult to predict. But one way is to
apply the theory of cooperative games [48] which oers a principled
approach to compute the expected outcome of a negotiation in the
presence of alternative oers.
5.1.1 Advertising revenue model and assumptions. Our model
is inspired from prior work [29] breaking down the value of ad-
impression, or cost-per-mille (CPM), into a function of three factors:
CPM(u,p,a) = RONa × TQMp × Inta (u) , (1)
where RONa (run-on-network) is an ad’s nominal cost in ad network
a, TQMp (trac quality multiplier) captures the quality of the pub-
lisher p (e.g., reputable publishers vs. sites distributing copyright
infringing content), and Inta (u) (intent) depends on the value of
information gleaned about the user u by the ad network. Intent
captures the fact that an impression can be sold for a larger price if
the ad network knows that the user has performed some previous
actions (e.g., frequent or recent visits to a product related webpage).
We include three cases for intent. 1) If the user chooses not to
reveal any information, this coecient is by convention equal to 1.
2)When tracking is not blocked, it takes on the value whichwe refer
to as implicit intent, Impla (u) ≥ 1, which depends on how much
information the ad-network can collect about the user’s browsing.
3) If the user decides to release all legitimate sites available to a,
the impression can be sold with a higher explicit intent Expl(u) ≥
Impla (u) independent of a.
Revenue sharing. We treat the advertising transaction as a
cooperative game capturing a simple dynamic: the more user in-
formation is known by the ad-network, if they cooperate via an
information market, the larger the revenue. We assume that each
player is incentivized by receiving a share of the revenue computed
using the Shapley value [48]. is mechanism has two advantages:
it ensures some form of fairness, and maximizes the likeness of
cooperation, i.e., users and aggregators participating in the market
(see Apx. C an overview of the Shapley value).
In practice, the aggregator a typically collects payments from
advertisers, gives a constant fraction (1 − α) to the publisher, and
then pays for data on the market at price set by this user’s Shapley
value. e market provider also receives its Shapley value from a.
5.1.2 Allocation of revenue to each player. In this section we in-
vestigate the impacts on the Shapley value of dierent cooperative
scenarios between players, i.e., users, aggregators, and the market,
under various market implementations. Table 3 shows the intent,
Inta (u), which impacts the revenue that dierent cooperating sub-
sets of players, S , can produce.
We start with the situation in which a mediated market m
centralizes data collection and/or analytics as in [31, 44] (lemost
subtable in Table 3). Without any cooperation, as in today’s status
quo, a user is tracked implicity, Inta (u) = Impla (u). However,
if user and aggregator join the market, a higher revenue can be
obtained corresponding to Inta (u) = Expla (u). In one case, as-
suming m and u collaborate (i.e., user sells her data) but a does
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Mediated marketplace
S Inta (u)
∅, {u }, {a }, {m }, Impla (u)
{ u, a }, { a, m } Impla (u)
{ u, m } 1
{ u, a, m } Expl(u)
Shapley value
u ,m Expl(u)−1−
3
2 (Impla (u)−1)
3
a Impla (u) + Expl(u)−13
Direct marketplace
S Inta (u)
∅ Impla (u)
{ u } 1
{ a } Impla (u)
{ u, a } Expl(u)
Shapley value
u Expl(u)−1−2(Impla (u)−1)2
a Impla (u) + Expl(u)−12
Publ. DNT mediated
S Inta (u)
∅, {u }, {a }, {m }, 1
{ u, a }, { a, m } 1
{ u, m } 1
{ u, a, m } Expl(u)
Shapley value
u ,m Expl(u)−13
a Expl(u)−13
Publ. DNT direct
S Inta (u)
∅ 1
{ u } 1
{ a } 1
{ u, a } Expl(u)
Shapley value
u Expl(u)−12
a Expl(u)−12
Table 3: Various market types and coalition scenarios: coecient multiplying advertising revenue for each coalition scenario
(top), Shapley value for each party (bottom).
not (i.e., a decides not to buy it), revenue eectively decreases as
implicit tracking is now blocked, Inta (u) = 1.
e analysis of this game yields Shapley values for each player
(shown in Table 3 boom). ese values specify how much each
player receives from the surplus, i.e., the potential revenue that is not
produced today due to lack of cooperation, which is proportional
to the added value of Expl(u) over Impla (u). Based on Table 3 we
make the following observations:
i) Ad-networks are always better o buying the users’ data.
Buying data makes them join the coalition, always leading to a
revenue increase. Hence they always receive a positive Shapley
value (Table 3).
ii) Users are not always better o selling their data. Pre-
cisely, a user is able to claim a positive share of the surplus only
if this surplus is large enough to compensate for the blocking of
implicit tracking. In a mediated market, it occurs as (Expl(u) − 1)−
3
2 (Impla (u) − 1) > 0 or ra (u) > 32 , where ra (u) = Expl(u)−1Impla (u)−1 is
the consent tracking li.
iii) Mediatedmarkets lower the bar for users to gain revenue
from the market compared with direct markets. Our analy-
sis extends to dierent market implementations. While mediated
markets simplify deployment, and oers a single point of sale to ag-
gregators, other architectures run data collection and/or analytics
on users’ end [23, 49]. is creates a direct market with aggrega-
tors entering transactions with users directly (Table 3 second from
the le). All previous observations generalize except that users are
beer o only if ra (u) > 2.
iv) Publishers enforcingDoNotTrack create ideal conditions
to deploy an informationmarket . We also analyze information
markets deployed over sites that enforce Do Not Track (Table 3,
third and fourth from le). In these scenarios publishers comply
with regulations or aim to improve their image vis-a-vis privacy
watchdogs and aggregators and users are always beer o buy-
ing/selling data via the market.
v) As soon as the possibility of users adopting an informa-
tion market is credible, a publisher always benets in the
long term by enforcing DNT . Note that publishers are driven by
revenue, and since they receive a xed share, they have an incentive
to keep intent (and thus revenue) as high as possible. Enforcing
DNT might initially undermine publishers’ prot, however it does
incentivize users to sell their data, making publishers’ revenue
higher in the long term.
Information markets increase ad-revenue and redistribute part of
the surplus to all participating entities. e price of data set by the
market always ensures that aggregators make a prot. However, it
does not necessarily mean that a user is always beer o selling
their data. In addition, a user’s decision to join a market is done
only once, aecting all of its related ad-revenue.
Here we apply our model to traces containing billions of Web
requests made by millions of users to understand how informa-
tion markets adopt at scale and the eect they have on total and
individuals’ revenue.
5.2 Data and adoption dynamics
Browsing data-sets We use anonymized HTTP traces from a uni-
versity network, a neighborhood of broadband users, and a country
wide mobile ISP with approximately 8k, 5k, and 3M users, respec-
tively. We process these traces into HTTP sessions and identify
publishers and aggregators for each session, for each user. Intent
values Impla (u) and Expla (u) are computed using browsing pro-
les observed with partial/global views (see [29]).
Distribution of consent tracking li . e increased value of
data in the market, relative to what aggregators can infer (ra (u)) is
shown in Fig 6 for all user-aggregator pairs. Only 30-40% of user-
aggregator pairs have ra (u) above 1.5 (threshold for a user to sell
data with a benet in a mediated market as shown in Sec. 5.1.2) and
28-34% have ra (u) above 2 (same threshold for a direct market). At
rst glance, the surplus appears oen too small for the information
market to positively benet users. is is especially true in the
mHTTP dataset, where the aggregators appear to make accurate
inferences, leading to high implicit intent which limits the value of
ra (u).
Myopic best response dynamics We assume each player aims
to maximize its immediate prot as it decides whether to join an
information market or not: A user will not join an information
market unless there exists an ad-network for which it can claim
positive prot (i.e., ra (u) > 2 for a direct market, or ra (u) > 3/2 for
a mediated one). Note that by doing that, it also blocks tracking of
other aggregators. An ad-network joins an information market
as soon as joining the market will increase its revenue across all
users and publishers in the ecosystem. Note that if many users
have joined the information market (and blocked tracking) the
aggregator may increase its revenue by joining the market, but still
fall short of its initial revenue values before any market deployment.
We analyze this in more detail in 5.4.
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Figure 7: Percentage of users and aggregators in the market
at the end of the simulation.
5.3 Spread of adoption
Fig. 7 shows the percentage of users and aggregators that eventually
join the market. In contrast with what our preliminary analysis of
ru (a)’s distribution predicted, we see a higher adoption rate, espe-
cially among aggregators. is shows that even a small number of
pairs (u,a) with high ru (a) is sucient to generate a network eect
of adoption. Indeed, more than 87% of the aggregators purchase
data from at least one user, and 14-22% of those do so only because
a user previously joined a market. As predicted, the mediated mar-
ket has a higher percentage of adoptions with an increase of 4-8%
relative to the direct market.
e same eect, although not as pronounced, is true for users:
more than 35% and up to 92% see a positive prot and hence sell their
data. Note that here we are only considering economic incentives
for users to join, while some additional users may do so for other
concerns such as privacy.
5.4 Eects on ad-revenue
i) Markets increase overall revenue by 9-12% . Fig. 9 shows
revenue at the end of the simulation normalized to initial utility,
both overall and for aggregators. ere is no signicant dierence
between the direct andmediatedmarkets in terms of overall revenue
increase, with both increasing overall revenue between 9-12%.
ii) Direct markets increase revenues for users. Fig. 8 shows
projected monthly revenue for users in the direct and mediated
markets. Users derive more revenue in the direct market since
revenue is not shared with the trusted third party. e median
monthly revenue in a direct market is 50% higher than in a mediated
one.
iii) User revenue is highly correlated with the number of ag-
gregators. Monthly revenue for users in the HTTP dataset is
signcantly higher than in the university or mHTTP datasets. is
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Figure 9: Total revenue normalized to initial revenue overall
and for aggregators.
stems from a high degree of correlation between aggregators the
user comes in contact with and their revenue (correlation coe-
cients of 0.6-0.9). Indeed, the average number of aggregators per
user is 43 in HTTP but only 5 in mHTTP and 9 in the university
dataset. e higher number of aggregators per user in HTTP can be
due to multiple users sharing a connection (recall this is a residen-
tial broadband trace). Next we consider how the market impacts
revenue, overall and for aggregators.
iv) Aggregator revenue decreases. Revenue for aggregators
decreases by 16-37% as compared to today’s status-quo aer infor-
mation market adoption. is result contrasts with the prediction
seen in Sec. 5.1 that, for a single transaction, aggregators always
benet from an information market. is emerges when the sys-
tem is analyzed at scale because a user interacts with multiple
aggregators. If it joins an information market to obtain revenue
from a transaction with an aggregator (typically, one that has high
ra (u)) part of the consequence is that tracking is blocked and this
negatively aects another aggregator revenue (typically, one with
low ra (u)). However, if we compare these revenues to what would
happen if users, publishers, or a regulation were to block tracking
with DNT [8], estimated in [29] to drop ad revenues by up to 75%,
deploying an information market allows aggregators to recover
from this loss. It also addresses privacy concerns of the users, as
information is obtained legally and transparently.
6 RELATEDWORK
e work presented in this paper lies at the intersection of online
advertisements, privacy, and economics.
Privacy preserving advertisements and analytics.
ere has been recent interest in solutions that protect users’ pri-
vacy while still enabling aggregators to provide targeted advertise-
ments, perform analytics and personalized services [19, 23, 24, 30,
32, 44, 49]. Privad [31], Adnostic [49] and RePriv [23] are browser
based systems that block access by 3rd parties to varying degrees
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and enable targeted ads to be shown to the user, without leaking
personal information. Information markets [2, 37, 44] also address
the concerns of aggregators to collect information, while allowing
users to choose what information about them can be released for
suitable economic compensation. Our goal in this paper is to study
the viability and eectiveness of such economically driven solu-
tions by designing, implementing and testing the solution in the
wild with real users.
Privacy and economics. Our work is closely tied to work
which considers personal information, through the lens of eco-
nomics [22, 26, 33, 43]. Both Reznichenko et al. [43] and Ghosh
et al. [26] study and design auction mechanisms; the former deals
with ad-space auctions and the laer deals with direct personal in-
formation (similar to [44]). Our work is dierent, in that we propose
and implement a system that combines privacy and performance,
and study the implications of selling information (via a direct or
mediated market) to various parties involved at a large scale using
Web traces.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Can a system for online privacy be mutually benecial to users
and online advertisers? In this paper we take a rst step towards
answering this question by designing an information market fo-
cusing on 3rd-party tracking. We discussed the requirements for
an information market, and designed and implemented our system
to provide privacy, Web performance, and revenue to users. We
evaluate feasibility of the market using a one-month eld study
with 63 users and observed that users actively engage with the
system and are willing to sell parts of their browsing data, however
these disclosures do not necessarily match up with their stated
privacy concerns. Users also declared that using an information
market aected their privacy aitudes.
We then proposed a model to capture the eects of information
markets on advertising revenue and investigated their viability.
Further, we considered the system at scale using traces contain-
ing billions of Web requests made by millions of users, to under-
stand economic ramications of an information market at scale and
showed that it can be protable to all parties. We found that adver-
tising revenue increases by 9-12% overall when all players, i.e., users
and data aggregators, cooperate – an observation that is at odds
with most current beliefs about privacy preserving techniques.
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A AUCTION MECHANISM
Here we explain the exponential auction mechanism [40] that has
the truth telling properties, and has been shown to be close to
optimal in terms of revenue for the seller. Note that users are
independent from each other and auctions are run per user.
We denote the user as u and the set of aggregators by A =
{a0,a1, ...,am }. e good being sold on the market is access to the
user, i.e., the ability to track the user on her whitelisted sites and
serve her targeted ads for a given time interval. A user’s browsing
behavior can be sold to multiple aggregators with no marginal cost
of reproduction, hence the market can be thought of as having an
unlimited supply. Intuitively, aggregator a should be willing to pay
to access u as long as the price to acquire her is smaller than the
additional revenue, va , gained by having access to u.
In the auction, we assume that each aggregator a in A who
is interested in accessing u bids a maximum price pa (u) that it is
willing to pay for access to user u. Assuming the nal winning bid
value is p(u), every winning bidder, i.e., bidders with bids higher
than this value, pay p(u), hence the total revenue of u is given by:
R [(pa (u)a∈A ,p(u)] =
∑
a∈A
p(u) × I{p(u)≤pa (u)} .
When p(u) > maxa∈A pa (u), the revenue will be zero, as the
price exceeds what aggregators are willing to pay. We wish to
choose p(u) to maximize this sum; all bids higher than this value
are considered winners and hence are given access to the user. e
winners pay p(u).
Following [40] we rst assign an initial value to p(u) according
to a measure ν (p(u)) onR and then re-weigh this measure to choose
the actual price used. To re-weigh, we use an exponential function
that puts more weight on high value of R, according to a parameter
ε > 0. PDF of the chosen price to track a given user is given by:
P(p(u)) = exp (εR [(pa (u))a∈A ,p(u)])ν (p)∫ ∞
0 exp (εR [(pa (u))a∈A , s])ν (s)ds
A standard approach is then to choose the initial distribution of p(u)
according to the Lebesgue measure on R, such that ν (p(u)) = 1.
By using ε , we have added noise around the valuemaximizing the
revenue, given the set of bids. Although it seems counter-intuitive
to use a suboptimal price, [40] shows that this (1) prevents any
bidder from winning more than a factor exp(ε) when cheating and
(2) still reaches a revenue that is within a good bound of the optimal
value if the number of aggregators is large. e expected revenue
is at least OPT − 3 ln(e+OPT ϵ 2m)ϵ , where OPT denotes the optimal
revenue andm is the number of buyer aggregators in the optimal
case.
B VALUING USER DATA
e goal is to estimate, for a given period [0, T], the advertisement
revenue that can be generated from a user based on her whitelist
and impressions that she generates (frequency of visits). We want
the model to be simple, and intuitively monotone in the number of
impressions and size of whitelists. We rely on keywords associated
with websites to estimate the ad-placing strategy maximizing the
total clicks generated. We assume: 1) the period is short enough
so that any advertiser would like to receive a single click from
the same user. Equivalently, the user would never click twice on
an ad by the same advertiser in the given period. In both cases,
playing an ad aer is was clicked creates no revenue. 2) the period
is short enough that a visit to a website at any time denotes a topic
of relevance to that user for the entire period and 3) the period is
long enough (or the system loses memory suciently quickly) so
that any action (ads shown, clicks, revenue generated) from the
past period is irrelevant.
We denote users by u, publisher or website by j , and advertisers
by a. Each website is associated with one or several keywords that
we denote by κ(j). Similarly, each advertiser has a set of relevant
keywords denoted by κ(a). Whenever a user visits a website j and
reveals that information, she eectively discloses the associated
keywords. We denote by κ(u) = ∪jvisited byuκ(j) the set of all these
keywords and are all relevant to target ads to u. We assume that
when u visits j and sees an ad from advertiser a, she decides inde-
pendently with probability pi click(u, j,a) to click on the ad, unless
it has clicked on it already during that period. For simplicity we
start with a constant probability, but in general this depends on the
website, the advertiser (typically through the associated keyword),
and the user. For instance, one may imagine that a user is more
likely to click for an advertiser associated with a keyword that
is associated with many sites she visits. Advertiser a can serve
an ad to a user u if and only if they share one relevant keywords
κ(u) ∩ κ(a) , ∅. It typically obtains this slot through a bidding
process. We will assume for simplicity that all advertisers’ bids are
equal to the average cost per click (CPC) for a keyword that they
have in common, and we denote this value by CPC(k). If this inter-
section has multiple keywords, then the advertiser will typically
bid with the highest keywords as it denotes higher interest in the
user. ese values are estimated using Google AdWords keyword
planner tool.
During the period, a user generates N (u, j) impressions on a
website j. Out of the total number of impressions created, the
system decides to display a number of ads associated with a, na .
e probability that all of these fail to generate a click is (1 −
pi click(u, j,a))na . Hence the optimal expected value generated by
clicks, depending on which ads are played, can be found as the
solution of the following optimization problem, which can be solved
by a simple greedy algorithm:
max
∑
k ∈κ(u)
CPC(k)
∑
a such that k (a)=k
(
1 − pi click(u, j,a)
)na
such that
∑
a
na =
∑
j
N (u, j) = N (u)
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C SHAPLEY VALUE OVERVIEW
In a cooperative game, the set of players is denoted as N . We call
any subset S ⊆ N a coalition of players. For each coalition S,
we denote by V (S) the worth function, which measures the total
revenue produced as a result of the coalition S.
We dene themarginal contribution of player i to a coalition S ⊆
N\{i} as ∆i (S,V ) = V (S ∪ {i})−V (S). Note that the contribution
of a player only depends on the worth function V (S).
Shapley value determines how the total worth of the coalition,
captured by V (S), should be shared among the players in S. More
specically, the Shapley value of player i is denoted by φi (S,V )
and is uniquely dened by the following three axioms:
Axiom 1: (Eciency)
∑
i ∈S φi (S,V ) = V (S). is ensures that
revenue assigned to the players is the total revenue created by the
coalition.
Axiom 2: (Symmetry) If for all S′ ⊆ S\{i, j}, V (S′ ∪ {i}) =
V (S′∪ {j}), then φi (S,V ) = φ j (S,V ). is means that two players
who contribute the same amount to revenue receive an equal share
of the revenue created.
Axiom 3: (Fairness/Balanced Contribution) For any i, j ∈ S,
j’s contribution to i equals i’s contribution to j, or, in other words
φi (S,V ) − φi (S\{j},V ) = φ j (S,V ) − φ j (S\{i},V ). is addresses
fairness between any pair of players.
Based on the axioms above, one can show that the Shapley value
φ can be computed as follows [47]:
∀ i ∈ S , φi (S,V ) = 1|S|!
∑
pi ∈Π
∆i (S(pi , i),V ) (2)
where Π is the set of all |S|! orderings of S and S(pi , i) is the set of
players preceding i in the ordering pi .
e Shapley value of a player i can thus be interpreted as the
expected marginal contribution ∆i (S′,V ) where S′ is the set of
players inS preceding i in a uniformly distributed random ordering
of S.
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